Ke.ro    or      rar-t"     o'ii.U.ewr 


CcfcVLl 


STEPHEN  Bo  WEEKS 

CLASS  OF  1886:  PUD.  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSfTY 


OF  THE 


TIE  WEEKS  ODUECFfflON 

©F 


From  Utica  Morning  Herald,  Dec.  15, 1897. 

IHERO  OF  FORT  FISHER 

[General  Curtis'  Address  Before  ihe 
Historical  Society. 


SUBJECT  WAS   'FORT  FISHER.' 


[Many  Grand  Army  Men  and  Histor- 
ical Members  Hear  the  General  on 
a  Subject  on  Which  He  is  Well 
Qualified  to  Speak — Extracts  From 
Official  Documents. 

General  N.  M.  Curtis  of  Washington 
!  lectured  before  the  Oneida  historical  so- 
|  ciety  last  evening  on  a  subject  of  which 
I  he  is  eminently  qualified  to  speak,  "Fort 
Fisher."  The  auditorium  of  the  Mun- 
sdn-Williams  memorial  was  filled  with 
gfand  army  men  and  their  wives,  and 
members  of  the  society.  General  Curtis 
was  greeted  with  hearty  applause  as  he 
[entered  the  hall  with  Thomas  R.  Proc- 
jtor,  the  vice  president  of  the  society. 
Mr.  Proctor  introduced  General  Curtis 
with  these  words:  "Ladies  and  Gentle- 
men— It  requires  but  four  words  to  in- 
troduce the  lecturer  of  this  evening, 
1'the  hero  of  Fort  Fisher.'  " 

General  Curtis  spoke  for  an  hour  and 
half,  illustrating  his  lecture  by  a  large 
Iwall  map.  Hfs  graphic  story  of  the  bat- 
Jtle  in  which  he  bore  so  prominent  a  part 
[aroused  the  patriotism  of  his  audience. 
[He  said: 

At   the   first   interview      between      General 

I  Grant  and  Admiral  Porter,  the  admiral  ob- 
jected to  the  selection  of  General  Butler  to 
command  the  army  forces.  At  this  interview 
Weitzel  was  agreed  upon.  General  Grant  di- 
rected General  Butler  to  send  General  Weit- 
zel down  to  reconnoirter  Port  Fisher.  Gen- 
eral Grant  states   in  forwarding   Butler's   re- 

•  port  of  Jan.  3,  1865,  that  "my  orders  to  Gen- 
eral Butler  to  prepare  it  were  given  verbally, 

!  to  avoid  publicity  of  the  time  of  sailing  and 
destination."     Dec.  6,  1864,  in  writing  instruc- 

I  tio-ns  to  General  Butler  General  Grant  stated: 
"The  first  object  of  the  expedition  under  Gen- 
eral Weitzel  is  to  close  to  the  enemy  the  port 
of  Wilmington.  *  *  *•  The  object  of  the 
expedition  will  be  gained  by  effecting  a  land- 
ing on  the  mainland  between  Gape  Fear  riv- 
er and  the  Atlantic  north  of  the  north  en- 
trance to  the  river.  Should  such  landing»be 
effected  whilst  the  enemy  still  hold  Fort 
Fisher  and  the  batteries  guarding  the  en- 
trance to  the  river,  then  the  troops  should 
entrench  themselves  and  by  co-operating  with 


the  navy  effect  the  reduction  and  capture  of 
those  pieces."  General  Butler,  at  10  p.  m., 
Dec.   24,    1864,    wrote   Admiral   Porter: 

"We  will  endeavor  to  effect  a  landing  above 
Flag  Pond  hill  battery,  between  that  ana 
Half  Moon,  at  such  an  hour  as  may  be  fixed 
upon  by  consultation  between  yourself  and 
General  Weitzel,  who  will  have  command  of 
the  troops,  and  who  will  meet  you  at  any 
hour  you  choose  to  arrange  details.  *  *  * 
I  design,  in  the  first  place,  to  send  on  shore 
a  party  of  reconnoissanee  sufficiently  strong 
to  hold  the  landing  if  we  gain  a  good  hold, 
and  then  to  land  as  rapidly  as  possible  our 
whole  force,  and  if  from  the  reconnoissanee 
it  is  deemed  practicable  to  attempt  an  as- 
sault ou  Fort  Fisher  the  assault  will  be 
made." 

Under  the  plans  agreed  upon  between  Gen- 
eral Weitzel  and  Admiral  Porter,  I  was  de- 
tailed to  land  with  500  of  my  brigade,  by  row 
boats  supplied  by  the  navy  in  charge  of  Lieu- 
tenant (now  commodore)  Farquier.  Having 
got  my  men  in  the  boats  formed  in  line  with 
a  launch  carrying  a  howitzer  on  each  flank,  I 
directed  them  to  maintain  their  alignment 
and  reach  the  shore  as  soon  as  possible;  at 
the  same  time  requesting  the  lieutenant  to 
put  me  on  the  beach  in  advance  of  the  line. 
About  this  time  I  saw  a  boat  pass  the  right 
of  my  line  headed  for  the  shore.  I  asked  that 
I  be  landed  first.  My  crew  were  the  better 
oarsmen  and  I  landed  and  carried  Captain 
Glisson's  flag,  taken  from  the  gig,  to  the  sand 
dunes  before  our  competitors  reached  the 
shore.  The  boat  brought  General  Weitzel. 
He  congratulated  me  on  winning  the  race  and 
said,  "I  had  offered  $1,000  to  beat  your  boat." 
I  said  the  difference  between  a  boat  crew 
from  a  transport  and  one  from  a  United  States 
man-of-war  was  more  than  one  thousand  dol- 
lars, and  that  all  I  had  to  do  was  to  request 
the  officer  in  charge  to  land  me  first.  As 
soon  as  the  troops  landed  and  formed  in  line, 
pickets  were  thrown  out  to>  the  north  and 
west,  and  flankers  as  we  moved  down  the 
beach.  Soon  after  we  started  Captain  Koonts, 
company  A,  42d  North  Carolina  infantry,  oc- 
cupying Flag  Pond  battery,  half  a  mile  south 
of  our  landing,  raised  a  white  flag,  indicating 
his  desire  to  surrender,  and  his  command  of 
67  men  and  officers  were  taken  off  by  boats 
from  the  naval  vessels.  The  log  book  of  the 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  of  Dec.  25,  1864,  states 
that  we  took  possession  of  Flag  Pond  battery 
at  3  p.  m.  We  then  marched  down  the  beach 
about  one  mile  south  of  Flag  Pond  battery, 
and  halted.  General  Weitzel  made  a  careful 
examination  of  Fort  Fisher  and  its  surround- 
ings and  stated  the  fort  was  not  injured  by 
the  navy  fire— only  one  gun  displaced— and  re- 
quested me  to  take  his  glass  and  report  how 
I  found  it.  I  looked  and  agreed  with  him  as 
to  the  physical  condition  of  the  work.  We 
were  at  that  time  about  one  and  a  half  miles 
north  of  Fort  Fisher.  General  Weitzel  says  in 
his  report:  "I  proceeded  in  person,  accom* 
panying  the  142d  New  York,  to  within  about 
800  yards  of  Fort  Fisher,  a  point  from  which 
I  had  a  good  view  of  the  work.  From  what 
I  saw  there  and  before  that  time,  and  from 
what  I  had  heard  from  what  I  considered  re- 
liable sources,  I  believe  the  work  to  be  a 
square  bastioned  work;  it  has  a  high  relief, 
a  wide  and  deep  ditch,  excepting  on  the  sea 
front,    a   glacis,      has   casemates     and   bornb- 

'proofs  sufficiently  'arge  to  hold  its  garrison. 
*  *  *  I  returned,  as  directed,  to  the  majo^ 
general  commanding,  found  him  on  the  gun- 
boat   Chamberlain     within     easy    range    and 

'good  view  of  the  work,  and  frankly  reported 


to  him  that  it  would  be  butchery  to  order  an 
assault  on  that  work  under  the  circumstances. 
After  examining  it  himself  carefully,  he  came 
to  the  same  conclusion,  and  directed  the 
troops  to  be  re-embarked." 

General  Weitzel  makes  no  mention  of  the 
orders  given  me  when  he  left  to  report  to 
General  But'er,  but  in  his  testimony  before 
committee  on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  page 
76,  he  says:  "After  I  had  made  a  reconnois- 
sance,  I  returned,  as  I  had  been  directed,  to 
General  Butler,  to  make  my  report.  I  di- 
rected General  Curtis  to  remain  in  command, 
and  to  push  on  towards  the  work  until  he 
was  stopped,  and  to  find  out  what  was  there; 
and  if  he  discovered  anything  new  to  imme- 
diately report  it  to  General  Butler,  and  I  left 
a  signal  sergeant  with  him  for  that  purpose." 

It  was  probably  about  3:20  p.  m.  when 
General  We;tzel  left  me  to  report  to  Gen- 
eral Butler.  The  signal  sergeant  did  not  re- 
main with  me.  In  General  Butler's  testimony 
before  the  committee  on  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  page  23,  he  says:  "General  Weitzel 
stated  that  he  thought  it  was  impossible  to 
assault  the  fort  successfully.  Being  unwill- 
ing to  leave  the  matter  without  trying,  and 
seeing  from  the  state  of  the  weather  that  it 
must  be  an  assault  or  nothing,  I  said  to  Col- 
onel Comstock,  who  was  on  board  with  me, 
'Jump  into  a  boat  with  General  Weitzel,  (Col- 
onel R.  H.  Jackson,  not  General  Weitzel, 
went  with  Colonel  Comstock.)  pull  ashore, 
and  examine  with  General  Weitzel,  (Colonel 
Jackson;)  and  report  to  me  if  an  assault  is 
feasible:  to  me  it  does  not  look  possible,  but 
I  am  unwilling  to  give  up.'  I  had  a  vivid 
perception  of  the  future  which  has  overtaken 
me.  They  went  on  shore.  The  surf  had  be- 
gun to  rise,  so  that  they  got  very  wet  in 
landing.  At  the  same  time  General  Graham 
reported  to  me.  He  said,  'General,  you  have 
got  either  to  provide  for  those  troops  to-night 
on  shore  some  way,  or  get  them  off,  because 
it  is  getting  so  rough  that  we  can  not  land 
much  longer.'  *  *  *  Considering  a  few 
moments,  I  determined  the  course  of  action 
that   should  govern  me." 

Aill  this  must  have  occurred  before  4  p.  m. 
Captain  James  Alden,  commanding  the  Brook- 
lyn, reports:  *  *  *  "At  4  o'clock,  just 
two  hours  after  the  landing  commenced,  the 
general  commanding  came  alongside  of  this 
ship  and  said:  'It  has  become  necessary  to 
re-embark  the  troops;  will  you  send  your  boats 
to  assist?'  You  can  judge  of  my  surprise  at 
the  turn  affairs  had  taken,  for  at  that  mo- 
ment everything  seemed  propitious,  the  bom- 
bardment was  at  its  hight,  little  or  no  surf 
on  the  beach,  and  no  serious  indications  of 
-bad  weather." 

The  reconnoitering  party  effected  a  landing 
at  2:10  p.  m.,  and  was  followed  by  all  the 
second  division  and  one  regiment  of  colored 
troops,  (about  4,000  men,)  before  the  order  to 
re-embark  was  given  by  General  Butler.  All 
remained  on  the  beach  near  the  point  of  land- 
ing excepting  a  portion  of  the  first  brigade. 
At  four  o'clock,  when  the  order  was  given  to 
re-embark  a  detachment  of  the  reconnoitering 
party  had  reached  Craig's  Landing,  and  Lieu- 
tenant Simpson  cut  the  telegraph  wire,  thus 
breaking  communication  between  the  fort  and 
Wilmington.  The  skirmish  line  was  ap- 
proaching the  fort,  and  less  than  half  a  mile 
away.  At  4:20,  when  a  navy  shot  cut  the 
garrison  flagstaff,  the  skirmishers  were  at  the 
stockade,  and  Lieutenant  Walling  in  com- 
mand, went  thro  the  ditch,  stockade,  up  the 
parapet,  and  brought  the  flag  away.  He  pre- 
sented it  to  me  at  the  bank  of  the  ditch.     I 


immediately  sent  an  officer  to  the  reserve  and 
directed  them  to  immediately  come  down  to 
the  earthwork  at  Cape  Fear  river  about  800 
yards  north  of  the  flank  of  the  fort,  and  then 
go  up  the  beach  and  report  to  General  But- 
ler that  we  had  cut  the  telegraph  line,  break- 
ing communication  with  Wilmington,  and 
captured  the  garrison  flag,  which  I  was  about 
to  take  to  the  beach  and  exhibit  to  the  navy 
that  they  might  direct  their  fire  in  support  of 
any  subsequent  movements  we  should  make. 
Two  musket  shots  were  directed  at  the  party 
carrying  the  flag  to  the  beach.  They  went 
over  us.  Quite  high  shots  yon  can  see,  in  or- 
der to  go  over  the  head  of  one  of  the  party. 
After  reaching  the  beach,  and  seeing  no  move- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  reserve,  I  went  up  to 
ascertain  the  failure  to  comnly  with  my  or- 
der to  advance,  and  was  then  informed  that 
a  short  time  before  the  receipt  of  my  orde* 
an  order  had  been  received  from  the  com- 
manding general  to  retire  up  the  beach,  and 
that  it  had  been  sent  to  me  at  the  western 
end  of  the  line,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
it  was  an  order  from  my  superior,  my  own 
order,  being  directly  contrary  to  that  from 
headquarters,  had  been  held  in  abeyance  un- 
til I  should  be  made  aware  of  the  nature  of 
the  order  of  the  commanding  general.  This 
order  was  probably  received  about  the  time 
that  the  flag  was  captured.  Notwithstanding 
the  order  to  retire,  I  took  such  of  my  brigade 
as  had  come  up.  and  moved  down  to  the  earth- 
work before  mentioned,  some  800  yards  from 
the  fort,  sending  the  117th  regiment  up  the 
Wilmington  road  running  near  the  Cape  Fear 
river  with  orders  to  advance  a  mile  if  they 
could  do  so  without  resistance  from  the  ene- 
my, and  to  establish  a  picket  line  to  extend 
from  the  Cape  Fear  river  across  the  penin- 
sula to  the  flankers  we  had  already  thrown 
out  when  we  marched  down  the  beach.  In 
making  this  movement,  Captain  Stevens,  with 
two  men,  went  in  advance  of  the  regiment  as 
skirmishers  to  prevent  its  falliiig  into  an  am- 
bush, and  when  they  had  advanced  a  little  to 
the  north  of  Craig's  Landing  Major  Reese  of 
the  North  Carolina  junior  reserves  stepped  in- 
to the  road,  threw  up  his  hands  and  surren- 
dered before  a  shot  had  been  fired  or  the  reg- 
iment had  arrived  in  sight.  A  portion  of  his 
command  escaped,  but  some  200  and  odd  of- 
ficers and  men  were  brought  in  and  finally 
sent  north.  The  regiment  at  the  same  time 
captured  two  guns  of  a  light  battery  and  six 
caissons.  A  courier  carrying  a  message  out 
of  the  fort  was  shot  and  his  horse  taken  only 
a  short  distance  from  the  parapet.  At  the 
conclusion  of  these  operations  a  second  order 
was  received  directing  me  to  retire.  To  this 
I  sent  in  reply  a  communication  stating  what 
had  been  accomplished  subsequently  to  my 
first  report,  stating  there  was  no  enemy  in 
sight  and  that  no  resistance  had  been  of- 
fered beyond  the  two  musket  shots  fired  at 
the  party  carrying  the  flag  to  the  beach,  and 
I  should  hold  his  order  in  obeyance  until  the 
commanding  general  could  become  acquaint- 
ed with  the  defenseless  condition  of  the  work. 
Soon  after  this,  at  dark,  Colonel  Comstock 
and  Colonel  Jackson  came  to  this  out-work, 
closely  followed  by  the  division  commander. 
To  them  a  detailed  statement  was  made  of 
the  operations  of  the  reconnoitering  party  up 
to  the  time  of  their  arrival,  and  they  were 
requested  to  notify  General  Butler,  that  in  my 
opinion  the  fort  could  be  successfully  assault- 
ed the  next  morning,  one  hour  after  the  navy 
should,  open  fire.  Neither  of  these  officers 
would  assume,  any  responsibility  as  to>  my 
failure  to  comply   with  the   orders   to  retire, 


but  General  Ames  stated,  "If  I  felt  confident 
that  I  could  capture  the  fort  I  ought  to  make 
the  attempt  with  the  men  I  had  at  my  dis- 
posal.." I  stated  that  it  was  then  dark  and 
the  navy  was  retiring,  and  as  it  retired  the 
enemy  would  come  out  from  their  bombproofs 
and  man  their  guns  and  would  slaughter  me 
should  I  then  attempt  an  assault  without  the 
protection  of  the  naval  fire,  and  that  I  could 
not  assault  until  after  daylight  and  the  navy 
should  keep  the  enemy  in  their  bombproofs. 
These  officers  returned.  Colonel  Comstock, 
as  I  believed  from  what  he  said,  intended  to 
advise  General  Butler  to  prepare  for  an  as* 
sault  the  next  morning.  One  hour  after  this 
I  received  the  third  order  to  retire,  which  1 
complied  with  by  withdrawing  my  skirmish- 
ers from  the  fort  and'  pickets  from  the  Wil- 
mington road,  and  with  our  prisoners  marched 
up  the  beach  to.  the  point  of  debarkation. 
There  I  found  that  the  troops  which  had 
landed  and  remained  on  the  beach  in  that  vi- 
cinity had  all  re-embarked.  I  got  off  a  por- 
tion of  my  command  and  the  commissioned 
confederate  officers,  when  the  surf  became  so 
high  the  boats  could  not  live,  as  stated  by 
those  in  command  of  them.  Between  six  and 
seven  hundred  of  my  command  and  two  hun- 
dred and  thirty  prisoners  remained  on  shore 
until  we  were  taken  off  on  the  following  Tues- 
day afternoon. 

From  an  examination  of  the  chronological 
order  of  events,  as  they  transpired  from  2:10 
p.  m.  until  4  p.  m.,  it  will  be  seen  that  about 
two-thirds  of  General  Butler's  command  ef- 
fected a  landing  on  the  beach,  and  that  no 
report  from  the  reconnoitering  party,  which 
had  been  sent  to  the  front  with  orders  "to 
report  anything  that  might  be  discovered  to 
General  Butler,"  had  been  received  by  him. 
He  had  acted  solely  on  his  own  judgment  and 
the  advice  of  General  Weitzel  not  to  assault 
based  on  the  information  obtained  from  the 
observation  made  of  the  fort  at  a  distance 
of  a  mile  and  a  half — a  distance  so  great  t  hat 
he  could  not  see  its  formation,  as  is  evidenced 
by  his  report,  in  which  he  states  that  "it  was 
a  square  bastioned  fort,  with  casemate  and 
a  glacis."  It  really  had  one  bastion,  no  case- 
mate and  no  glacis.  General  Butler  did  not 
wait  to  receive  a  report  of  the  discoveries 
made  by  the  reconnoitering  party,  and  failed 
to  wait  for  a  report  from  Colonel  Comstock 
and  Colonel  Jackson,  who  were  sent  ashore  to 
specially  ascertain  if  in  their  opinion  "an  as- 
assault  was  feasible."  The  opinion  of  Gen- 
eral Weitzel  not  to  assault  the  work  was  made 
in  absolute  ignorance  of  the  orders  to  Gen- 
eral Butler,  wherein  it  was  stated  "the  ob- 
ject of  the  expedition  will  be  gained  by  ef- 
fecting a  landing  on  the  mainland  between 
Cape  Fear  river  and  the  Atlantic  north  of  the 
north  entrance  to  the  river." 

General  Butler  telegraphed  at  8  p.  m.,  Dec. 
27,  1864,  to  General  Grant,  announcing  the  re- 
turn of  the  expedition  to  Fortress  Monroe, 
and  gave  a  brief  summary  of  the  events  at- 
tending it.  At  5:30  p.  m.,  Dec.  28,  President 
Dincolh  telegraphed  General  Grant  as  follows: 

"If  there  be  no  objections,  please  tell  me 
what  you  now  understand  of  the  Wilmington 
expedition,  present  and  prospective."  To 
which  General  Grant  replied,  at  8:30  p.  m. : 
"The  Wilmington  expedition  has  proven  a 
gross  and  culpable  failure.  Many  of  the 
troops  are  now  back  here.  Delays  and  free 
talk  of  the  object  of  the  expedition  enabled 
the  enemy  to  move  troops  to  Wilmington  to 
defeat  it.  After  the  expedition  sailed  from 
Fortress  Monroe  three  days  of  fine  weather 
was  squandered,  during  which  the  enemy  was 


without  a  force  to  protect  himself.  Who  is 
to  blame  I  hope  will  be  known." 

The  morning  of  the  29th  of  December,  the 
transport  upon  which  I  returned  from  Fort 
Fisher  dropped  anchor  in  Hampton  Roads. 
I  went  on  shore  for  breakfast  and  was  sent 
for  by  General  Grant  and  questioned  as  to 
what  I  saw  and  did  after  landing  at  Fort 
Fisher.  I  gave  him  a  detailed  account  of  the 
operations  of  my  command  while  on  shore, 
and  a  description  of  the  fort.  He  stated  that 
my  description  differed  from  that  of  other  of- 
ficers, who  reported  "it  as  a  square  bastioned 
•work  with  casemates  and  glacis,  and  its  ex- 
terior sides  averaging  about  200  yards."  I 
replied  that  I  had  been  within  a  few  yards 
of  it  and  knew  it  had  no  casemates,  no  glacis 
and  only  one  bastioned  angle,  and  that  its 
land  face  was  about  half  a  mile  long,  and  its 
sea  face  over  a  mile  long;  no  parapet  on  the 
south  or  west.  He  said  the  expedition  ought 
not  to  have  failed  and  that  he  might  desire 
to  hear  further  from  me.  I  returned  to  my 
ship  to  wait  for  other  transports  to  come  in 
before  we  should  proceed  up  the  river. 

In  a  few  hours  after  I  left  General  Grant 
I  received  a  telegram  from  General  Weitzel 
to  report  at  once  to  his  headquarters.  I  went 
up  in  advance  of  my  troops,  and  when  I 
reached  General  Weitzel's  headquarters  he 
said  he  had  sent  for  me  in  obedience  to  a 
telegram  from  General  Grant,  who  wanted  a 
detailed  account  of  what  I  and  the  officers  of 
my  command  who  were  nearest  the  fort  had 
seen.  I  sent  for  Captain  Walling,  142d  New 
York,  who  brought  the  garrison  flag  from  the 
fort,  Lieutenant  George  Simpson,  142d  New 
York,  who  cut  the  telegraph  wire,  and  Lieu- 
tenant G.  W.  Reese,  117th  New  York,  John 
W.  White,  James  Spring  and  Henry  Blair  of 
the  142d  New  York  volunteers,  who  were  on 
on  the  skirmish  line.  The  statements  of 
thesja  officers  and  men  were  taken  down  and 
sent  to  General  Grant,  thro  Colonel  Comstock. 
General  Grant  forwarded  them  to  the  secre- 
tary of  war  "with  the  request  that  these  pa- 
pers be  filed  with  Major  General  Butler's  re- 
port of  the  expedition  against  Fort  Fisher, 
N.  C,  as  statements  appended  to  said  report 
by  me.  I  should  have  appended  them  when 
I  forwarded  the  report,  but  Lieutenant  Colo- 
nel Comstock,  aide-de-camp,  to  whom  they 
were  made,  was  absent  on  the  second  expe- 
dition against  the  fort  and  had  them  with 
him.  These  statements  of  the  officers  and 
men  named  were  reduced  to  writing  imme- 
diately after  the  return  of  the  unsuccessful 
expedition  against  Fort  Fisher,  and  were 
handed  to  Colonel  Comstock  about  the  2d  day 
of  January,  1865.  General  Butler,  before  or. 
dering  the  re-embarkation  and  return  of  the 
expedition  he  assumed  to  command,  might 
have  had  within  information,  and  it  was  his 
duty,  before  giving  such  orders,  to  have 
known  the  results  of  the  reconnoissance. 
which  could  have  been  most  satisfactorily 
learned  from  those  most  in  advance." 

These  quotations  from  the  official  records 
plainly  show  who  it  was  that  disregarded  the 
instructions  of  General  Grant  and  was  re- 
sponsible  for  the  failure  of  the  first  expedi- 
tion. 

Some  careless  readers  have  asserted  that 
the  inquiry  ordered  by  the  senate,  Jan.  12, 
1865,  "Resolved,  That  the  committee  on  the 
conduct  of  the  war  be  directed  to  inquire  into 
the  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  late  expedi- 
tion against  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  an<2 
to  report  the  facts  to  the  senate."  fully  ac- 
quits General  Butler  of  the  responsibility 
charged  by  General  Grant. 


A  careful  reading  of  the  evidence  taken  by 
that  committee  will  show  that  the  order  of 
?tbe  senate  was  not  complied  with.  The  in- 
quiry was  made  not  to  ascertain  the  causes 
of  the  failure,  but  as  to  the  propriety  of  as- 
saulting the  fort,  as  the  findings  of  the  com- 
mittee clearly  show:  "In  conclusion,  your 
committee  would  say,  from  all  the  testimony 
before  them,  that  the  determination  of  Gen- 
eral Butler  not  to  assault  the  fort  seems  to 
have  been  fully  justified  by  all  the  facts  and 
circumstances  then  known  or  afterwards  as- 
certained." 

The  result  of  the  second  expedition  fully 
corroborates  the  correctness  of  the  description 
of  the  works  on  Federal  Point  given  by  my- 
self and  members  of  my  command,  who  were 
the  only  persons  within  800  yards  of  the  main 
work,  and  justified  our  opinion  that  the  fort 
could  have  been  captured  on  the  first  expe- 
dition had  the  commanding  general  complied 
with  General  Grant's  orders  and  intelligently 
attempted  to   have  carried  out   the  plans  he 


announced  to  Admiral  Porter  the  night  before 
the  landing.  The  reasons  given  for  refusing 
to  carry  out  those  plans  were  not  justified 
by  the  circumstances  and  conditions  then  ex- 
isting. To  the  first  claim  that  the  troops  on 
shore  were  without  provisions  or  ammunition, 
it  needs  only  to  be  stated  that  ample  sup- 
plies  of  both  for  thirty  days  could  have  been 
landed  in  one-half  the  time  given  to  re-em- 
barking the  troops— about  3,500 — which  were 
taken  off  that  night.  To  the  claim  that  the 
troops  on  shore  could  not  maintain  their  po- 
sition against  the  large  force  of  the  enemy  in 
their  front,  he  had  the  assurance  of  Admiral 
Porter  that  the  fleet  could  hold  the  poisition 
and  give  them  complete  protection.  The  opin. 
ion  of  Admiral  Porter  was  supported  by  the 
fact  that  not  one  of  the  naval  vessels  left 
the  station,  nor  did  one  of  the  frail  transports 
waiting  to  carry  the  troops  north  leave-  It* 
anchorage  in  front  of  the  beach  until  all  the 
stranded  troops  were  taken  on  board  Tues- 
day afternoon. 


■MM  imSITY  0F  NC-  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


00032743899 


FOR  USE  ONLY  IN 
THE  NORTH  CAROLINA  COLLECTION 


